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Philosophy of Art

The New Classic

Modern art expanded what could count as art. The New Classic does not propose undoing that freedom. It asks what should come after it: a renewed demand that ideas become form, that materials matter, and that artistic freedom be matched by judgement.

Handmade papers with ultramarine and gold pigments and fine brushes arranged on a neutral studio workbench.

The question that changed

There was a moment in the history of modern art when one of its central questions changed.

Across very different artistic traditions, works had long been judged through embodied qualities: composition, material, skill, proportion, image, ornament, expression, ritual effectiveness, narrative or symbolic meaning. The standards differed radically between cultures and periods, and there was never one universal measure of artistic achievement.

But during the twentieth century another question became increasingly powerful:

What if the definition of art itself were the artwork?

That question produced one of the great intellectual expansions of modern culture.

It also created a problem that I believe art has not adequately answered.

I call my response The New Classic.

The New Classic is not Neoclassicism. It does not ask artists to return to Greece or Rome, to paint like Raphael, to restore academic realism, or to pretend the twentieth century never happened. Nor is abstraction its enemy.

It is a proposal for something more fundamental:

Art should once again accept responsibility for form, beauty, material, skill and aesthetic experience.

An idea may deepen an artwork.

It should not be permitted to replace the work.

Modernism did not destroy form

It would be historically inaccurate to blame abstraction for the disappearance of standards.

Some of the most radical modern painters were intensely concerned with form. Kandinsky believed that colour and form possessed their own affective power, acting on the viewer independently of images and objects, and argued for abstraction in Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1911). From 1947 Rothko spent the rest of his career layering rectangles of colour onto fields of colour, and to my eye organised colour, scale and space with extraordinary deliberation. For One: Number 31, 1950, Pollock laid the canvas on the floor and poured, dribbled and flicked enamel paint onto it; I read that painting as making gesture and material action part of its structure. Clement Greenberg's modernist formalism, whatever one thinks of its limitations, insisted that painting acknowledge openly "the limitations that constitute the medium of painting": the flat surface, the shape of the support and the properties of the pigment. MoMA's account of Abstract Expressionism similarly describes bold, gestural abstraction, particularly on large painted canvases, in an art committed to expressing personal convictions: expression carried by the painting rather than abandoned by it.

A painting does not cease to possess form merely because the figure disappears.

This matters because The New Classic should not begin by inventing a false enemy.

Abstraction can possess immense discipline. A single field of colour may be formally richer than an impeccably rendered portrait. Technical difficulty alone does not create artistic value, just as representation alone does not create beauty.

The deeper rupture came elsewhere.

When the idea became sufficient

Marcel Duchamp's readymades challenged assumptions that had seemed almost inseparable from art: that the artist should make the object by hand, that art should reflect the artist's skill, and that beauty is a defining characteristic of art. I would add a fourth: that aesthetic experience should occupy the centre of the encounter.

For In Advance of the Broken Arm, Duchamp selected a snow shovel, hung it from the ceiling of his studio and called it art. The 1915 original is lost; the one in MoMA's collection is a fourth version, made in 1964. MoMA describes the readymades as aiming to shift attention from what Duchamp called the "retinal", pleasing to the eye, toward the intellectual: an art in "the service of the mind".

Conceptual Art pushed the proposition further.

Joseph Kosuth's One and Three Chairs represents one chair three ways: a manufactured chair, a photograph of it and a dictionary definition of the word. Kosuth made none of the three; he selected and assembled them. The material arrangement matters, but for me its central force lies in the questions produced by the relationship among object, image and language: what is being represented, and where does meaning reside?

This was not merely an incidental tendency within Conceptual Art. Philosophical accounts of conceptualism describe it as locating the identity of the artwork in the idea rather than the object, and as appealing to the intellect: valuing what a work lets us understand over aesthetic experience in the traditional sense. The expansion of artistic media was equally radical: in principle, nothing could be ruled out as a possible artistic medium.

That revolution achieved something important.

It gave artists enormous freedom.

But freedom has consequences.

The problem is not that everything literally became art

"Anything can be art" is an understandable complaint, but it is too crude. Contemporary philosophy has never reached a simple consensus that every object automatically becomes art because somebody declares it so. The definition of art remains contested. Institutional, historical, aesthetic and hybrid accounts continue to offer competing explanations of what makes something an artwork.

But something profound did change.

In "The Artworld" (1964), Arthur Danto described perceptually indistinguishable painted canvases that could nevertheless be strikingly different works of art, with different titles and contrasting artistic and aesthetic qualities, and concluded that the painted canvas alone is not the work of art. The visible properties of a canvas could no longer, by themselves, settle its artistic status.

And here I think we should separate two questions that contemporary culture too often collapses:

Can something be classified as art?

and

Has something achieved enough to deserve artistic value?

They are not the same question.

The first concerns admission.

The second concerns judgement.

We became extraordinarily adventurous about admission and strangely nervous about judgement.

The New Classic is an attempt to restore the second question.

A painting must have a reason to be a painting

For painting, I propose a simple and deliberately demanding principle:

The meaning of a painting must be embodied in the painting.

Its composition matters.

Its colour matters.

Its rhythm, proportion, edges, line, scale, surface, material, density, emptiness and spatial relationships matter.

Its physical presence cannot be an accidental container into which an idea has been poured.

If the entire significance of a painting can be removed from the canvas and transferred without meaningful loss into the paragraph beside it, then we should at least ask an uncomfortable question:

Was the paragraph doing the real work?

The wall text should deepen the encounter.

It should not resuscitate the corpse.

This does not mean painting must be decorative. It does not mean a painting must be pleasant.

It means painting must earn the act of looking.

Beauty after beauty

Beauty is perhaps the most difficult word in this argument because it carries enormous historical baggage.

It was a primary theme for ancient Greek, Hellenistic and medieval philosophers, and central to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, beauty was declining both as a major subject of philosophical aesthetics and as a dominant stated aim of art. Philosophical interest returned later: renewed interest and critique from the 1980s, and interest in something like its classical sense from the 1990s.

The New Classic therefore cannot simply restore an old definition of beauty. Nor can beauty mean prettiness.

Beauty can be severe.

It can be mournful.

It can contain asymmetry, rupture, darkness, violence and strangeness.

A tragic painting does not need to become cheerful before it can become beautiful.

By beauty I mean something closer to achieved aesthetic necessity: the sensation that relationships of colour, material, rhythm, form and meaning have been discovered, tested and made convincing.

Beauty is not the absence of difficulty.

It is the transformation of difficulty into form.

And ugliness should not receive an automatic intellectual promotion simply because beauty once enjoyed an unjustified privilege.

Ugliness can be powerful.

Disorder can be necessary.

Discomfort can be truthful.

But ugliness is not automatically profound any more than beauty is automatically superficial.

Skill without nostalgia

The same distinction must be made with skill.

The New Classic does not require every painter to demonstrate academic draftsmanship.

A perfectly rendered hand can belong to an empty painting.

A seemingly simple mark may require decades of visual intelligence.

Skill means command over the language the artist has chosen.

It means decisions are decisions rather than accidents conveniently explained afterward.

It means knowing material well enough to make it carry thought.

It means understanding when precision is required and when looseness is required; when ornament strengthens the image and when it suffocates it; when emptiness is alive and when the canvas is simply unfinished.

Craft is not the enemy of thought.

Craft is thought made physical.

Nick Zangwill's theory of "aesthetic creation" offers one philosophical precedent for taking intentional aesthetic making seriously. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states it, his account describes artistic creation as intentionally bringing about aesthetic properties through non-aesthetic properties of the work. One need not accept his theory as a complete definition of art to recognise the challenge it presents to any account in which aesthetic achievement is treated as merely optional.

What The New Classic refuses

The New Classic refuses the idea that novelty is automatically achievement.

It refuses the idea that incomprehensibility is evidence of intelligence.

It refuses the idea that technical ability is somehow embarrassing.

It refuses the assumption that beauty is politically or intellectually naive.

It refuses the elevation of intention above result.

And most importantly, it refuses declaration as sufficient creation.

To nominate something is not necessarily to transform it.

To explain something is not necessarily to embody it.

To shock is not necessarily to reveal.

To break a rule is not necessarily to discover a new one.

Artistic freedom matters.

But freedom without discrimination eventually becomes weightless.

If every boundary is treated only as something to overcome, transgression itself becomes a convention.

Rebellion can become academic too.

The strongest objection

There is a serious danger in what I am proposing.

Words such as standards, beauty, mastery and the classics have often travelled with cultural hierarchies.

Feminist aesthetics and art history have argued, for example, that supposedly neutral institutions and categories of fine art excluded many women from recognition and training, while forms of creative production associated with domestic life were removed from the history of art proper and relegated to the lower-status category of "craft". Feminist scholarship has also challenged inherited canons and the traditional appreciative stance, arguing that its supposedly universal viewpoint was a particular one.

The New Classic must therefore refuse a return to one authorised canon.

There is no reason the word classic should belong exclusively to one civilisation.

There is no single compulsory anatomy, perspective system, ornament, iconography, colour theory or relationship to representation.

The standard should not be stylistic obedience.

It should be formal responsibility.

Different traditions can pursue beauty differently while still demanding discipline, intelligence, transformation and coherence.

This is the distinction on which the entire proposal depends:

Pluralism is not the same as absence of standards.

We can accept many languages without pretending that every sentence written in them is equally good.

Thought must acquire a body

One of Conceptual Art's strongest defences is that art can produce forms of thought and understanding that beauty alone cannot provide.

Conceptual practice deliberately foregrounded intellectual inquiry, institutions and the nature of art itself. Philosophical accounts of the movement therefore discuss its cognitive value: what a work can add to our understanding of a topic, notion or event, rather than primarily aesthetic pleasure.

The New Classic need not reject thought.

It should demand more from it.

The question is not:

form or meaning?

It is:

why did we allow ourselves to choose?

A great painting can think.

A great painting can accuse.

It can remember.

It can mourn.

It can question history, identity, violence, exile, power, gender, ecology or technology.

But in painting, these thoughts should become colour, space, material, rhythm and image.

The concept should acquire a body.

Otherwise we have not expanded painting.

We have merely used painting as stationery.

Not a return, but a next movement

In 1956, Morris Weitz argued that art is an "open concept": new cases arise that call for a decision whether to extend the concept to cover them or to close it, and so art cannot be defined.

The New Classic does not need to close that concept.

It does not need to reverse modernism, abolish conceptual practice, or decide that the experiment of the twentieth century was a mistake.

It needs to make a different decision within the freedom those experiments created.

After more than a century spent expanding what may become art, perhaps the next radical gesture is not another expansion.

Perhaps it is concentration.

Not fewer ideas.

More demanded of every idea.

Not obedience to tradition.

A deeper encounter with tradition.

Not a return to realism.

A return to looking.

Not beauty as decoration.

Beauty as intellectual, emotional and material achievement.

Not technique for its own sake.

Technique in the service of necessity.

Not form instead of meaning.

Meaning made inseparable from form.

The twentieth century demonstrated how radically the category of art could expand.

The twenty-first century might ask the more difficult question:

What should an artwork be worthy of?

That is where I would begin The New Classic.

A movement in which painting again has to stand before its explanation.

In which beauty is not an embarrassment.

In which mastery is not dismissed as conservatism.

In which tradition is neither worshipped nor discarded, but transformed.

In which freedom survives—

but judgement returns.

The future of art does not need fewer ideas.

It needs ideas with bodies.


The New Classic — Beauty, Skill and Judgement After Modern Art

Notes and sources

  1. Museum of Modern Art, Marcel Duchamp, In Advance of the Broken Arm, August 1964 (fourth version, after the lost original of November 1915). Collection record, object number 690.2006. https://www.moma.org/collection/works/105050 (accessed 20 September 2026).

  2. Museum of Modern Art, Joseph Kosuth, One and Three Chairs, 1965. Collection record, object number 393.1970.a-c. https://www.moma.org/collection/works/81435 (accessed 20 September 2026).

  3. Museum of Modern Art, "Abstract Expressionism". Art term. https://www.moma.org/collection/terms/abstract-expressionism (accessed 20 September 2026).

  4. Natalie Dupêcher, Vasily Kandinsky, Museum of Modern Art, 2018. Artist page. https://www.moma.org/artists/2981 (accessed 20 September 2026).

  5. Karen Kedmey, Mark Rothko, Museum of Modern Art, 2017. Artist page. https://www.moma.org/collection/artists/5047 (accessed 20 September 2026).

  6. Museum of Modern Art, Jackson Pollock, One: Number 31, 1950, 1950. Collection record, object number 7.1968. https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78386 (accessed 20 September 2026).

  7. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting" (1960). Reprinted in The Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957–1969, edited by John O'Brian, University of Chicago Press, 1995, ISBN 9780226306247.

  8. Elisabeth Schellekens, "Conceptual Art". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 7 June 2007, substantive revision 23 March 2022. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conceptual-art/ (accessed 20 September 2026).

  9. Thomas Adajian, "The Definition of Art". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 23 October 2007, substantive revision 30 July 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-definition/ (accessed 20 September 2026).

  10. Paisley Livingston, "History of the Ontology of Art". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 29 August 2011, substantive revision 11 April 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art-ontology-history/ (accessed 20 September 2026).

  11. Crispin Sartwell, "Beauty". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 4 September 2012, substantive revision 17 June 2026. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauty/ (accessed 20 September 2026).

  12. Carolyn Korsmeyer and Peg Brand Weiser, "Feminist Aesthetics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 7 May 2004, substantive revision 12 September 2025. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-aesthetics/ (accessed 20 September 2026).

  13. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics". The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15, no. 1 (September 1956): 27–35. https://doi.org/10.2307/427491.

  14. Nick Zangwill, Aesthetic Creation. Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199261871.